DIVIDED SENTIMENT IN THE MOUNTAINS:
POLITICAL ALLEGIANCES IN CENTRAL APPALACHIA
AT THE OUTSET OF THE CIVIL WAR
John M. Brown
POLITICAL SCIENCE 5061, Politics of Appalachia
Dr. Barry L. Tadlock
Across the years, many military conflicts have been described as a “rich man’s war, but a poor man’s fight.” Such a description has been used, accurately one could argue, to describe the American Civil War of 1861-65. This was a conflict exacerbated by ardent politicians on both sides: radical abolitionists in the North and fire-eating secessionists in the South. Caught right in the middle of the political wrangling were the common people of the border states, some of whom, by reason of geographic location or community or family pressure, were persuaded to “join a side.”
Motivated by political rhetoric, some took up arms in one cause or the other. Many others were torn, advocates of neither side, people whose sole wish was to go on with their lives uninterrupted by sectional strife or armed conflict. Still others changed sides, motivated by social pressures and military alliances which often shifted. While about 70,000 Kentuckians fought for the Union and some 40,000 for the Confederacy, “of Kentucky’s eligible white males, 71 percent chose not to fight at all.”
Confusion and division certainly characterized many of the people and politicians of central Appalachia at the outset of the Civil War. While impossible to thoroughly gauge retrospectively people’s minds and hearts, we have three measures whereby we may seek to deduce prevailing contemporary sentiment: 1) statements made at the time (primary sources); 2) election results (political allegiances); and 3) recruitment for each of the two sides (political alignments). We shall examine certain events and sentiments in Central Appalachia – namely Eastern Kentucky and Western Virginia – to gauge the loyalties and subsequent actions of people in this part of Appalachia.
Though “slavery” is a word used to describe the cause of the momentous national divide that would cost more than 600,000 lives, that single word by itself is inadequate to explain the national rupture that lead to the Civil War. There were two diametrically opposite groups: “radical abolitionists,” determined to rid the entire nation of the perceived moral evil of slavery wherever it existed; and “fire-eaters” in the South, who had an historic and economic vested interest in the institution of slavery itself and were determined to see it protected in perpetuity and legally expanded into new territories as the nation grew.
But for many other Americans – North and South – slavery was not the sole issue in the struggle. Many Southerners owned no slaves and had no particular motivation in seeing slavery either abolished or protected, and many Northerners had no particular avarice toward the institution itself and would be perfectly content to allow its continuance in the South, being neither ardent opponents nor vociferous proponents of slavery.
The situation is actually even more complicated: there were Southerners who felt allegiance to the Union, and would support both it and slavery’s continued preservation. Many slave owners in Kentucky, for example, advocated the Union but not abolitionism. Other radical abolitionists welcomed Southern secession, and would be glad to see the “slave section” of the nation break away.
This author’s study of the Civil War era and political allegiances during the time has led to the creation of these categories of affiliation and loyalty: there were those who
-Opposed slavery, and would engage in conflict or sanction secession to eradicate it where it already existed or stop its growth into new territories;
-Opposed slavery personally, but would not interfere with its existence in order to guarantee preservation of the Union;
-Upheld slavery, and would engage in national division and armed conflict to safeguard it or confront any threat, real or perceived, against it;
-Upheld slavery, but counseled a conciliatory course, not wanting to divide the Union over it;
- Neither advocated slavery nor abolitionism, and were simply indifferent about it one way or another.
In the counties of Central Appalachia, slavery was legally protected but had never been a significant force in the lives of the people, most of whom were too poor to own slaves and did not have the large, labor-intensive agricultural operations demanding great numbers of laborers. And though most residents never owned slaves, there was never a strong abolition movement in Appalachia.
Many Appalachians were thus indifferent to the matter of slavery; it did not affect their lives one way or another. Though a few may have had ethical qualms about the institution itself, and a few others may have had economic interest in slavery’s perpetuation, there is simply not any great volume of primary source material which this writer can find that indicates a strong sentiment on the part of most of the people either for or against slavery. What “other people” did or did not do in “other parts” of the country simply was not of great practical concern or philosophical interest to the average mountaineer, so long as his way of life was undisturbed. Politicians in the mountains recognized this ambivalence, and acted accordingly.
Only when war actually came and some began to “join sides” did the average mountain family find itself in a quandary about which way to go. And even for the mountaineers who did favor secession, the key factor was not slavery: “The issue which did concern these men was the issue of Federal coercion…These men were fighting…[for] the freedom to choose their own form of government.”
THE ELECTION OF 1860
“In 1860, the people of the United States, both North and South, were more interested in the elections than usual.” Why?
The Presidential election of 1860 – its background, candidates, and outcome – reflected the national division and political crisis that forty years of compromise had failed to halt: a political party dissolved (Whig); a political party ruptured (Democrat); a compromise political party arisen (Constitutional Union); and another new political party created (Republican) which, though not strongly united in its proposals or candidates, would win the election without anything approaching a “national mandate” and be thrust into the national spotlight for the next several decades.
In April 1860, the Democrats met in convention in Charleston, South Carolina amidst extreme contention characterizing regional sections of the county. Southerners, distrustful of front-runner and eventual nominee Illinoisan Stephen Douglas, accused Northerners of aiding abolitionism and demanded a resolution upholding slavery; this guarantee many Northern Democrats could not, or would not, make. Further, it would have been contrary to Douglas’ own view of “popular sovereignty.” Many Southern delegates thereupon withdrew from the convention, and met June 28 in Baltimore, Maryland, to nominate John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. Thus was the Democrat party split into two opposing factions.
Former members of the Whig Party and the Know-Nothing Party and a few former Southern Democrats who wanted to avoid secession, and some nationalists who refused to recognize either a “Northern” or “Southern” political party, formed a separate party dedicated to “the Union, the Constitution and the enforcement of laws” which became known as the Constitutional Union Party. They nominated John Bell of Tennessee for President, and Edward Everett of Massachusetts for vice-president. This pro-Union party was neutral regarding slavery.
The relatively new Republican Party, composed of former Democrats, Whigs, and Know-Nothings, free-soilers, mild abolitionists and ultra-abolitionists, met in convention in Chicago, Illinois in May 1860. Several potential nominees, representing various groups within the party, included William Seward of New York, Salmon Chase of Ohio, Nathaniel Banks of Massachusetts, Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania, Caleb Smith of Indiana, and Abraham Lincoln of Illinois. Lincoln, an unlikely, often overlooked but attractive candidate, was finally nominated on the third round of balloting.
The campaign of 1860 was sharp in its divisiveness: in the far North, the Republicans emphasized moral and economic wrongs of slavery; in the deep South, the Breckinridge Democrats urged voters to assert their rights. Along the Ohio River, the “borderland” between North and South, the rhetoric on all sides was less sharp as more muted appeals were made so as not to drive voters away from a particular candidate, and campaigns were focused similarly toward those both north and south of the Ohio River. Meanwhile, the Douglas Democrats were kept on the defensive, seeking to appeal to both North and South, while the Constitutional Unionists offered vague compromises to preserve the Union without a specific plan of action.
In 1860, Kentucky had twelve and Virginia had fifteen electoral college votes: John Bell won both states’ electoral college votes, capturing 45.18% of the popular vote in Kentucky and 44.63% of the popular vote in Virginia. John Breckenridge, the Southern Democrat candidate, was a close second in both states (and also in Tennessee). While Stephen Douglas won four of the Appalachian counties in Virginia, all the other Appalachian counties in Kentucky and Virginia, like the other counties in the states, voted for John Bell who, representing the Union while upholding the status quo regarding slavery, was a “middle candidate” who best fit the borders states and the Appalachian counties therein.
Nationally, of course, Abraham Lincoln won without a majority of the popular vote but with enough electoral votes. Interestingly, one can note a sharp distinction between counties immediately north of the Ohio River and those south in Ohio, Kentucky, and Virginia: of the ten Ohio counties bordering the river, Lincoln won five, Bell one, and Douglas four; of the eight Kentucky counties and eight Virginia counties bordering Ohio and the river, Lincoln won none, Bell predominated in Kentucky, and the Virginia vote was split between Bell and Breckenridge, with two counties going for Douglas. The line between North and South which the Ohio River represented was sharply defined and differentiated.
THE SECESSION CRISIS
While slavery is often seen as ‘the cause’ of the Civil War, the reality is much more complicated. The war began as an effort to preserve the Union because certain southern states had begun to secede after the election of 1860 and before Lincoln was even inaugurated. Only well into the war did slavery become an additional “cause” of the War. While compromises between various sections and politicians vying for power underlay events for forty years prior to the War, the immediate cause was secession.
Virginia was not among the first states to secede, but eventually did in April 1861 - much more reluctantly than the “cotton belt” states of the deep South. This reluctance caused former Virginia Governor Henry A. Wise to promise provisional Confederate President Jefferson Davis that “he would be able to ‘stampede’ his state into secession,” and in this regard “he certainly tried,” seeking to push Governor John Letcher to seize government installations after the firing on Ft. Sumter in Charleston, South Carolina.
In the Appalachian western counties of Virginia, which included at the beginning of the war all the territory that in 1863 would become the state of West Virginia, sentiment was especially divided. While “Secessionists…held mass meetings in at least twenty-one counties in present West Virginia” and “condemned federal coercion” and “endorsed a secession convention,” yet when Virginian’s actual secession convention was finally held, numerous western counties of Virginia – Appalachian counties – voted to remain in the Union, and some votes from certain of these counties never actually even came in to be counted.
The political situation in Kentucky was strained between the national sections: Kentucky had a long emotional attachment to the South (many Kentucky settlers had come from Virginia and North Carolina, and Kentucky had developed trade via the Mississippi River to southern states), but had significant economic ties to the North via the Ohio River. Also, Kentucky had long been connected to Henry Clay, the Great Compromiser, slave owner and politician, who had helped stem the tide of national division for many years. Further, Kentucky was a slave state, but slavery was not as significant to the economy as in the deep South. To complicate political matters even more, Kentucky’s governor, Beriah Magoffin, had ties of affection to Southern neighbors but did not want to see the Union dissolved, and Kentucky’s legislature was at political odds with the Governor. Political appeasement of all concerned meant that Kentucky thus determined to steer an “official” course of neutrality, both the Governor and the Legislature “officially” declaring Kentucky “off limits” to soldiers of either side (while privately favoring one side or another). The Governor and Legislature proclaimed Kentucky’s neutrality May 20, 1861. The majority of Kentucky’s politicians wanted to preserve the Union while protecting slavery and forestalling any armed conflict within the boundaries of the Commonwealth. Their goals was to not allow either side to fight within the Commonwealth, allowing Kentucky to serve as a sort of “buffer zone” between two conflicted regions. For example, Governor Magoffin would on the one hand warn President Lincoln that Kentucky would “furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States,” yet on the other hand would never recognize some Kentuckians who wanted to ally with the Confederacy.
So where did this put Appalachian eastern Kentucky? When neutrality was soon violated, and Kentuckians were forced into taking sides, loyalties in the mountain counties were as divided as the rest of the state. Some mountaineers wanted to preserve the Union. Though the institution of slavery was never as significant as in other regions of the state, some mountaineers were anxious to join in “a little rebellion” against the federal government while asserting “states’ rights” against centralized power. Still other mountaineers simply wanted to go on with their everyday lives without getting involved in sectional conflict that didn’t seem to have much application to them one way or another.
Some fervent pro-Southern Kentucky politicians, determined to do what Kentucky’s governor and legislature failed to do and enlist Kentucky as a Confederate state, held a convention in Russellville to “declare” Kentucky “seceded” and elect a Confederate Kentucky Governor and Legislature. Though delegates came from sixty-eight of Kentucky’s counties, only one delegate from Kentucky’s twenty-two mountain counties even attended the Russellville Convention.
CENTRAL APPALACHIAN LOYALTIES
So from the mountain counties, some young men joined the Union causes; some joined the Confederate cause; some “changed sides” during the War (both ways); and others simply hoped the war would steer clear and them, their families, and their communities – a hope that all too often would not be realized.
James E. Copeland has made an extensive study regarding white males from various Appalachian Kentucky counties and which side they volunteered for, thus summarizing county sentiments by varying degrees regarding “loyalty” to the Union. This study leads one author to conclude that “…most of the population supported the cause of union, with a few significant pockets of Confederate sentiment,” while noting further that “eastern Kentuckians – like southwestern Virginians would have preferred to do – waited to see what the future held rather than make a strong commitment early to either cause.”
Though during the war years “both Union and Confederate armies penetrated the Appalachian region,” regarding the local population, “the indecisiveness of the mountaineers adversely affected the military goals in the region.” Though “from the beginning of the secession crisis President Abraham Lincoln viewed the supposedly loyalist mountain regions as an ideal base for military operations into vital Confederate territory, and a place to drive a wedge into Southern unity,” it became quickly apparent to both sides that absolute allegiance to either was elusive.
Meanwhile, we must also bear in mind during the course of the conflict, “the war brought real economic distress, poverty, and upheaval to southwest Virginia” and other parts of Appalachia, because, “foraging, impressment, conscription, and constant campaigning led to untilled fields, hunger, privation, and despair.”
What can we conclude about Central Appalachian loyalties? To assume that because the mountain counties of Central Appalachia did not contain great numbers of slaves most people rushed to supported the Union is an historically inaccurate simplification; but to assume that most Kentucky Appalachians were anxious to join in armed conflict for the Confederacy is also incorrect. Many simply sought a neutral course: “To the mountaineer, too early a commitment to one side or the other could spell doom….It was in his best interest to take a middle road until a surer path became available,” which led to “a complex loyalty pattern with regions that varied from person to person, home to home, and town to town.” This “complex loyalty” so frustrated Confederate General Humphrey Marshall, for example, that he complained the mountaineers of eastern Kentucky are mostly “…Unionists, but so ignorant they do not understand the question at issue.”
The western counties of Virginia which during the course of the war would divide from the rest of the state, were similar to Kentucky: “In present West Virginia sentiment was generally Unionist.”
Regarding southwest Virginia, the region “…was not bound to either north or south, but was more local and isolationist in its outlook.” Two key words here: “local” and “isolationist.” There were many people in Appalachia who were not embroiled in national politics and wanted simply to be left alone.
One author has listed as contemporary characteristics of “the mountaineer” such things as individualism, traditionalism, and even fatalism, and as such characteristics existing today are rooted in history and heritage, they help explain both the involvement and non-involvement of Central Appalachians. It was not unusual for Appalachian soldiers to simply leave their ranks at will to return home to farm, or check on their family’s safety, and return when they were ready. Somewhat typical of the mountaineer attitude, then, was this: if he wanted to fight, he fought; if he wanted to leave, he left.
Still, both the Union and the Confederacy actively courted the sentiments and enlistments of Appalachians: the area was considered significant to both sides, and both sides competed for recruitments and allegiances.
Some in the northwestern counties of Virginia who were ardent Unionists – and even a few abolitionists – determined to petition the government for separation of the western counties into a new state. These western counties would form the new state of West Virginia, all lying in the very heart of Central Appalachia.
Though Unionist sentiment was strong, there were many young men from these western counties who had already joined the Confederate Army, thus uniting their loyalties with the South. Huge companies of men had been created from Logan, Boone, Cabell, and Wayne Counties, for example. One of the Confederacy’s greatest heroes, Thomas Jonathan “Stonewall” Jackson, was born and raised in the northern part of what would become West Virginia (in fact his statue, along with Abraham Lincoln’s, graces the State Capitol lawn in Charleston).
Contrary to what one might expect, the Confederate supporters in these counties did not block the “secession” of western counties from Virginia. Actually, some supporters of the Confederacy also supported the creation of a separate state from western counties, unhappy with their perceived “exclusion” from Richmond for decades before the War began (illustrating complicated and divided political allegiances and convictions, indeed!). Regardless of the reasons for the War, or the outcomes sought by the two sides, the War provided an opportunity for people in western Virginia to have what they had wanted already anyway: a separate state. This sentiment was shared by supporters or both the Union and the Confederacy.
A series of conventions were held in Wheeling, beginning in May 1861, a “restored government” of Virginia was inaugurated in view of Virginia’s secession, and finally “on June 20, 1863, West Virginia became an independent state” and was, in fact, “the only change made in the map by the four long years of the Civil War.” Regarding its secession from Virginia, “West Virginia entered the Union with forty-eight counties.”
Thinking about divided political allegiances in the states inclusive of Central Appalachia, consider this summarization:
During the Civil War, the situation in the border states was dire, the population at odds over which side to support. When Tennessee seceded from the Union, East Tennessee tried and failed to secede from Tennessee. Kentucky remained in the Union, but the sympathies of a substantial portion of its citizenry lay with the Confederacy. West Virginia seceded from Virginia in 1863 in order to rejoin the Union. Many West Virginia soldiers who had been fighting for the Confederacy switched sides, while others remained loyal to the South.
Reconstruction and post-reconstruction in Central Appalachia was a time of violence and bloodshed: “The divisions fostered and reinforced through four years of armed conflict remained especially pronounced along the borderland of the war in eastern Kentucky and southwestern Virginia.” Undoubtedly, many of the animosities exhibited and even violence demonstrated during the era of the feuds in Central Appalachia have roots in the violence, bloodshed, and animosities experienced during the War, including the raiders and bushwhackers, as Berea College professor Elijah Dizney observed, when he “proclaimed the Civil War to be ‘the most fundamental and precipitating cause’ of the feuds” of Appalachia. It is not that the feudists were “re-fighting” the Civil War from two different sides, for many of them were on the same side during the conflict; rather, the war perpetuated an environment of bloodshed and violence that continued afterwards.
Some political loyalties and allegiances in the mountains that yet exist today have an unbroken connection back to this time: Lewis County, Kentucky, for example, was strongly pro-Union (its county courthouse with a statue of a Union Solider in front is reportedly the only such south of the Ohio River), as was Martin County, Kentucky, and to this day both remain staunchly Republican (the party of Lincoln) in sentiment and voting patterns. Floyd and Pike Counties in Kentucky, on the other hand, had strong Confederate sentiments, and remain to this day strongly Democrat in allegiance and voting patterns. Though later factors are significant of course (such as the Depression, Roosevelt, and the new Deal), we are compelled to note that political affiliation, county by county, is yet influenced by an event more than 150 years old.
Beyond allegiances north (Republican) or south (Democrat) during the war, the perceived injustices of the federal government’s military rule in Kentucky during the War, and events of Reconstruction afterward, both of which stretched or even exceeded the limits of federally assured civil rights and liberties, turned many Kentuckians away from the Republican Party and set in place strong family loyalty to the Democrats in most of eastern Kentucky that would endure beyond a century. This pattern emerged elsewhere in Appalachia as well, and the region, with few notable exceptions, became, and remains, a Democrat party stronghold.
Further, the divided allegiances in Central Appalachia relate to self-identification as well: Is eastern Kentucky or the entire state of West Virginia “southern” or “northern”? Actually, there are elements of both, geographically, culturally, and socially. Thus it was inevitable, perhaps, that this region, with economic and familial ties to both North and South, would be divided. Experience indicates that “Appalachian” is unique in its own right!
Also, events both before and soon after the Civil War helped distinguish Appalachia from other parts of the respective states in which Appalachian counties reside, and other parts of the nation itself. As a study commissioned by Kentucky state geologist Williard Jillson observed almost ninety years ago, “Between 1850 and 1870, there was a gradual separation of the mountain counties from those in the Blue Grass, and since 1870…the separation is complete.” The counties composing Appalachia solidified their distinctiveness; not only was Appalachian sentiment divided and confused during the Civil War, and not “typical” of other regions of the nation, but it soon became apparent that other distinctions prevailed in Appalachia, thus setting the region apart from other areas in the country. The Civil War helped establish a “mountaineer identity,” unique in comparison to other Americans.
One personal anecdote to illustrate divided allegiances: this summer this writer was visiting the cemetery in Elkhorn City, Pike County, Kentucky, in the heart of Central Appalachia and near the Virginia border. Toward the top of this cemetery is the grave of Mary Ramey Potter (1803-1874), daughter of the first white settler in that area of the county, with these words proudly inscribed: “Mother of 5 Confederate Soldiers.” Nearby are the graves of Union soldiers as well.
Many think of the Civil War and Reconstruction as “brother against brother,” of violence and bloodshed, of lawlessness and long-lingering hostility. And we observe that nowhere in America were these characteristics more in evidence than in Central Appalachian Kentucky and Virginia. Unfortunately for the residents of these areas, bloodshed and violence did not end with the Civil War.
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Davis, William C. Look Away! A History of the Confederate States of America. New York: The Free Press, 2002.
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Noe, Kenneth. “Appalachia’s Civil War Genesis: Southwest Virginia as Depicted by Northern and European Writers, 1825-1865.” West Virginia History 50 (1991): 91-108.
Nicholls, Lewis D. A Masterful Retreat. Avant Garde Publishing, 2006.
Pearce, John Ed. Days of Darkness: The Feuds of Eastern Kentucky. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010.
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Weller, Jack E. Yesterday’s People: Life in Contemporary Appalachia. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1965.
Williams, John Alexander. Appalachia: A History. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002.
 Anne E. Marshall, Creating a Confederate Kentucky: The Lost Cause and Civil War Memory in a Border State (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 20
 Grace Toney Edwards et al., eds. A Handbook to Appalachia (Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 2006), 7.
 Robert Perry, Jack May’s War (Johnson City, TN: The Overmountain Press, 1998), 5.
 Jeffrey C. Weaver, 45th Battalion Virginia Infantry (Lynchburg, VA: H. E. Howard, Inc., 1994), 1.
 James L. Abrahamson, The Men of Secession and Civil War 1859-1861 (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2000), 60-62.
 Edward Conrad Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War (New York, AMS Press, 1970), 51.
 Abrahamson, The Men of Secession and Civil War, 65.
 Gary C. Walker, The War in Southwest Virginia 1861-65 (Roanoke, VA: Gurnter Graphics & Printing Co, 1985), 5.
 See map in Edward Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War, 63.
 Harry Hansen, The Civil War: A History (New York: New American Library, 2001), 32-35.
 Walker, War in Southwest Virginia, 6.
 William C. Davis, Look Away! A History of the Confederate States of America (New York: The Free Press, 2002), 115.
 Otis K. Rice, West Virginia: A History (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985), 113
 Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War, 202.
 Kent Masterson Brown, The Civil War in Kentucky: Battle for the Bluegrass State (Mason City, IA: Savas Publishing Company, 2000), 24.
 Lewis D. Nicholls, A Masterful Retreat (Avant Garde Publishing, 2006), 13.
 Brown, Civil War in Kentucky, 5, 86.
 Smith, The Borderland in the Civil War, 356-358.
 Brian D. McKnight, Contested Borderland: The Civil War in Appalachian Kentucky and Virginia (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), 25.
 James E. Copeland, “Where Were the Kentucky Unionists and Secessionists?” Register of the Kentucky Historical Society 71 (1973): 357.
 Marshall, Creating a Confederate Kentucky, 26.
 McKnight, Contested Borderland, 1, 5.
 Noel Fisher. “Feelin’ Mighty Southern: Recent Scholarship on Southern Appalachia in the Civil War,” Civil War History 47 (December 2001), 334.
 Kenneth Noe. “Appalachia’s Civil War Genesis: Southwest Virginia as Depicted by Northern and European Writers, 1825-1865,” West Virginia History 50 (1991), 99.
 McKnight, Contested Borderland, 28.
 Rice, West Virginia, 112.
 Walker, The War in Southwest Virginia, 5.
 Jack E. Weller, Yesterday’s People: Life in Contemporary Appalachia (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1965), 29-40.
 Coleman C. Hatfield, The Feuding Hatfields & McCoys (Chapmanville, WV: Woodland Press, LLC, 2008), 18-20
 McKnight, Contested Borderland, 64.
 Weaver, 45th Battalion Virginia Infantry, 1.
 Phil Conley, West Virginia Yesterday and Today (Charleston: West Virginia Publishing Company, 1937), 116.
 Rice, West Virginia, 153.
 Lisa Alther, Blood Feud: The Hatfields and the McCoys – The Epic Story of Murder and Vengeance (Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2012), 30.
 McKnight, Contested Borderland, 227.
 Marshall, Creating A Confederate Kentucky, 131.
 John Ed Pearce, Days of Darkness: The Feuds of Eastern Kentucky (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2010), 4-5
 Darrell Haug Davis, The Geography of the Mountains of Eastern Kentucky (Frankfort, KY: The Kentucky Geological Survey, 1924), 6.